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To: Mr. John Chien, Chief Administrative Officer
UN Office of Human Coordinator in Iraq

Mr. Om Prakash, Chief
UN Guards Contingent in Iraq

From: Jayanti Prasad, Chief Resident Auditor
UN Office of Human Coordinator in Iraq
Internal Audit Division, OIOS

Subject: **Comprehensive Review of UN Guards Contingent in Iraq (UNGCI)**

The recommendations set out below are submitted for your consideration. Please comment on them and, where appropriate, specify the corrective action taken or provide a planned implementation schedule. When commenting please refer to the Assignment No. listed above and to the recommendation number in parenthesis in order to facilitate monitoring of its status (timely response, acceptance, implementation). Please reply by 01 September 2002.

Audit Observations and Recommendations

Introduction

1. Pursuant to the terms of the May 22, 1991 addendum to the United Nations Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) of April 18, 1991 with the Government of Iraq (and confirmed in a subsequent MOU on November 24, 1991), 500 UN Guards Contingent in Iraq (UNGCI) personnel were authorized for deployment in Iraq. The purpose of the deployment was to protect United Nations personnel, assets and operations linked to United Nations humanitarian programs in Iraq. The initial UNGCI deployment was in Baghdad, Basra, and the northern governorates of Erbil, Dohuk, and Suleimaniyeh. A subsequent MOU with the Government of Iraq on October 22, 1992 reduced the personnel ceiling of the UNGCI to 300, which was to be deployed in the three northern governorates with a small liaison team in Baghdad.

2. The UNGCI members are not part of U.N. staff, but are considered to be "experts on mission" overseen by the Office of Iraq Programme (OIP)/United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECORD). Since its arrival in Iraq, the UNGCI has expanded its activities from the initial assurance of physical protection for personnel and property in northern Iraq to a more active and preventive role. Current activities encompass: (i) advising agencies on security issues, undertaking 'Field Security Assessments' (FSAs); (ii) planning and overseeing preparedness for emergencies; (iii) providing or arranging for static protection of United Nations facilities; (iv) operating a

communications and movement tracking/control service; (v) conducting special investigations; and (vi) providing emergency medical treatment and emergency evacuation service. The coordination and verification of security provided by local authorities is in situ included in UNGCI's responsibilities.

3. The Office of the Iraq Program in New York is vested with overall responsibility for management of UNGCI and recruitment of UN Guards. In the field, it is supported through the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq (UNOHCI) whose head (Humanitarian Coordinator) is the 'Designated Official for Security' in Iraq. Under the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator in Erbil, the 'Deputy designated official for Security', the Chief of the Guard contingent, the 'Area Coordinator for Security' has the operational responsibilities.

4. The administrative support related to the day to day running of the UNGCI is provided by UNOHCI. This support encompasses planning and procuring all the supplies needed for the functioning of UNGCI. There is a small liaison office of UNGCI in UNOHCI, Baghdad. At the Headquarters level this support is provided by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) through its Field Administration and Logistic Division (FALD).

Financing

5. UNGCI is funded from the voluntary contributions of donor countries. Its other receipts are miniscule, and come from charges for the services, which it provides, to agencies like medical services etc. For the biennium ending 2001, this other income was \$513,084 which was less than 10% of a total income of \$5,403,289.

6. Complete data regarding financial reserves, annual statements of accounts etc. was not made available to us either at UNGCI or UNOHCI headquarters. From the statement for the biennium 2000-2001, we noted that the expenditure of UNGCI was \$6,056,819. During the same period, the income to the fund was \$5,403,289 and the shortfall of \$761,098 was met from the reserves, which depleted from \$3,215,275 to \$2,454,177. Thus, presuming the same rate of income and expenditure for future, audit estimated that the reserve funds would be exhausted in approximately six years.

7. UNGCI prepares a budget proposal every year and sends it to UNOHCI in Baghdad. Based on the UNGCI budget proposal, UNOHCI seeks approval from the Controller, through the OIP. For the year 2002, UNGCI had proposed an overall budget of \$4,636,090.

8. From the UNGCI budget, we observed that UNOHCI charges UNGCI \$240,000 per annum for providing 'Administrative support'. Furthermore, UNOHCI has budgeted for \$10,000 per month (\$7,500 in UNGCI budget proposals) for communication charges, which includes telephone, telex, facsimile, pouch service charges etc. Similarly, UNGCI is being charged \$2,500 per month for transport services provided to UNGCI officials for travel between Baghdad and Amman on recruitment, repatriation and other travels.

9. UNGCI has been partially funded by UNOHCI, which had been paying, direct costs (MSA and travel) of 23 out of 88 UNGCI personnel and 26% of its indirect costs.

This cost sharing was dependent on the UNGCI's financial health e.g. for the second half of 2001; UNOHCI share was limited to only the direct costs, in view of remaining balances. This system has been changed from 2002, whereby UNOHCI would bear 25% of the entire UNGCI budget.

10. The proposed budget for UNGCI, for the year 2002, has an increase of about 60% over the average annual expenditure in the last two years. Assuming the same pace of contributions in the coming years, we estimated that this would translate to a deficit of \$2,117,583 in 2002, which would almost wipe out the entire reserves (\$2,454,177) in UNGCI funds.

11. UNGCI's role in the 'Oil for food Program' for North Iraq is vital as it provides security to UN personnel and programme. However, the 'programme' itself gets its funds (2.2% and 13%) from the 'oil revenues', while the same is not true for UNGCI. In view of its precarious financial situation, it is imperative that long term measures should be found to finance UNGCI.

12. UNOHCI has, from time to time, financed part of UNGCI expenditure through various cost-sharing mechanisms. The funding of UNGCI from separate funds was a deliberate move and played a crucial role in entry of UNGCI in Iraq. Furthermore, SCR 986 funds are meant to be used as per the relevant Security Council Resolutions and the MOU with the GOI. We are therefore, of the opinion that legality of expenditure for UNGCI from UNOHCI funds (2.2% account) needs to be reconsidered, in view of the sensitivity of the issue.

13. Furthermore as UNOHCI already has a cost sharing mechanism with UNGCI, in our opinion, charging UNGCI \$240,000 for administrative support and \$120,000 for communication charges is not appropriate.

We recommend:

- (i) OIP explore alternative funding for UNGCI from sources such as loan/advances from DPKO or other funds. These could be repaid, once the contributions come up to the required level and would ensure financial security and stability of UNGCI for the duration of the program (AF02/22/1/101);
- (ii) OIP examine the legality of cost sharing expenditure out of SCR 986 funds being incurred by UNOHCI for UNGCI in order to mitigate the risk of embarrassment to the UN at a later stage (AF02/22/1/102); and
- (iii) UNOHCI abolish the 'Administrative Charges' (\$240,000 per annum), 'Communication Charges' (\$120,000 per annum) and transport charges (\$30,000 per annum) in order to help ease UNGCI's financial crisis. This is in accordance with the principle, of no cross billing amongst various UN Agencies, adopted by UNOHCI since January 2002 (AF02/22/1/103).

14. The comparison of UNGCI's budget for the year 2002 is given in the following table:

Table 1 Budget Proposals of UNGCI

| Description of Object Class | Proposed by UNGCI (in US \$) | Proposed by UNOHCI (in US \$) |
|------------------------------------|---|--|
| Posts controlled by staff | 424,930 | 520,783.33 |
| Other personnel related costs | 2,605,800 | 2,655,735.00 |
| Travel of Staff | 429,960 | 372,736.00 |
| Rental and maintenance of premises | 69,600 | 65,000.00 |
| Operating expenses | 773,050 | 624,466.90 |
| Communications | 108,000 | 120,000.00 |
| Supplies, furniture and equipment | 224,750 | 535,006.90 |
| Total | 4,636,090 | 4,893,728.13 |

15. Examination of the relevant documents and interviews with officials revealed the following weaknesses:

- Modifications to the proposals of UNGCI by UNOHCI were done without any further consultation with UNGCI. The charges 'levied' by UNOHCI were also fixed and changed unilaterally. For example, while UNGCI had proposed \$171,407 for operating costs of vehicles (including spare parts, repairs and maintenance, petrol, oil, lubricants and insurance), UNOHCI modified this to \$222,218 representing an increase of about 30%. We are of the opinion that the modifications to the budget proposals of the UNGCI should be done in consultation with the UNGCI.
- UNGCI did not get any feedback of the actual allotments made by OIP/Controller.
- We examined the reporting mechanism of UNGCI accounts. We found that a monthly account statement is prepared by UNOHCI a copy of which is sent to UNGCI. These accounts give summarized "Income and Expenditure" and "Liabilities and Asset" statement. Further, details of the transactions are given by object code.
- Our discussions with the Chief UNGCI revealed that, a purely financial statement, did not help UNGCI in assessing the financial situation or even tracking the expenditure. He stated that, he is not even aware that if an item that was projected in the budget, is actually in the procurement pipeline. This could lead to situations where an item being procured, is budgeted/requested once again.

We recommend that UNOHCI/OIP:

- (i) Make modifications to the UNGCI budget proposals, specifically where there are large variations, in consultation with UNGCI in order to ensure that UNGCI's operational requirements are not curtailed (AF02/22/1/104);
- (ii) Endorse the actual allotments to UNGCI in order to give them a clear idea of the position of funds for it's operational planning. (AF02/22/1/105); and

(iii) Provide UNGCI with a copy of Requisitions and Purchase Orders placed so

AC that they have information on what items are in the pipeline. (AF02/22/1/106) OS

Logistical Support by UNOHCI

16. Due to fund raising challenges faced by UNGCI, a new structure called 'Model C' was proposed and adopted by which financial and administrative responsibilities of UNGCI were transferred to UNOHCI. The Administration section of UNGCI has a skeleton staff of one officer and one local staff. This section receives all the supplies from UNOHCI, and passes them on to various sub-offices as per their needs. Consumable items, like stationery, supplies are received from UNOHCI every six months and are supplied as and when the requirement arises.

17. We found that the chief of UNGCI has no financial powers to sanction expenditure. For unforeseen day to day needs, which have to be urgently met, the staff of the administration section purchases the items locally from the market from their own personal money. Reimbursements are sought from the Deputy CAO of UNOHCI from UNGCI's petty cash held by UNOHCI, North. However, a revolving advance of about \$200 had been provided to the Suleymaniah and Dohuk offices.

18. UNOHCI is responsible for overall Administrative support to UNGCI. UNGCI has a liaison office in Baghdad where there is one supply clerk who receives goods on behalf of UNGCI and is associated with the 'Receipt and Inspection' work at times. He is required to liaise with various sections for UNGCI requirements. We found that there was no focal point in UNOHCI, hence coordination suffered.

19. The allotment received by UNOHCI for UNGCI are then spent on the items in the budget. We found that:

- There is no further co-ordination between UNOHCI and UNGCI relating to expenditure of the funds by way of seeking feedback on actual requirements before going for procurement, etc.
- The requirements, which form the basis of budget proposals, may change during the period. However, there is no formal mechanism for corrective feedback in the system. This situation could lead to a mismatch in actual needs and items supplied to UNGCI resulting in dissatisfaction by UNGCI and compromising its operational requirements.

20. For other requirements of UNGCI, requisitions are sent to UNOHCI as required. Subject to the availability of the funds in the UNGCI budget the case is processed for procurement.

21. We found that there was no mechanism for UNGCI to send requisitions, since it is not a 'requisitioning' authority, all administrative support being provided by UNOHCI. UNGCI normally sends its requirement to the concerned section (ITS, GSS etc) in UNOHCI (North), who in turn requisition the item from UNOHCI Baghdad for formal procurement. Many of the requirements of the UNGCI are of an immediate operational nature (e.g. Communication supplies) and need to be fulfilled quickly. Yet, a mechanism for prioritization of requests did not exist.

22. Many of the communications from UNGCI, especially to higher authorities, are sensitive in nature. Some of these are sent through cryptofax and some through Lotus Notes based e-mail system.

23. We observed that UNGCI did not have a cryptofax of its own and therefore these faxes were sent from the cryptofax available with the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (DHC) in northern Iraq. As a result of which a UNGCI officer takes a cryptofax to the secretary of the DHC, who then transmits it over the cryptofax machine. We are of the opinion that an increase in the number of links in the chain is likely to compromise confidentiality.

24. The confidentiality of an email message is compared to that of a postcard in the mail system. Thus, features of Notes like encryption need to be used as a compensatory control mechanism, whenever the e-mail message is of a sensitive nature. In discussions, the Chief, UNGCI stated that though formal instructions were not issued, this was being followed in practice. In addition, a Standard Operating Procedure on 'document security' is being prepared.

We recommend:

- (i) UNOHCI provide UNGCI Headquarters and Erbil Sector with an advance of \$300 and \$200 dollars, respectively in order to stop the practice of using personal funds for official work (AF02/22/1/107);
- (ii) A liaison focal point for UNGCI be designated in UNOHCI in order to improve the quality of administrative support to UNGCI (AF02/22/1/108);
- (iii) UNOHCI prepare a procurement plan in consultation with UNGCI and that it be reviewed jointly every quarter. This would reduce the gap between actual needs and procurement for UNGCI. (AF02/22/1/109);
- (iv) UNGCI be made as a 'requisitioner' so that it can send its requirements directly to UNOHCI through the liaison focal point in order to reduce the time taken to service UNGCI. (AF02/22/1/110);
- (v) UNGCI issue administrative instructions providing the basis for classifying e-mail messages and ensure that the sensitive and confidential messages are encrypted using the facility provided by Lotus Notes. This would mitigate the risk of compromising the confidentiality even if the e-mail messages are intercepted. (AF02/22/1/111); and
- (vi) A cryptofax machine be provided to UNGCI for use in transmission of sensitive documents (AF02/22/1/112).

Personnel Management

25. The administration section of UNGCI is responsible for personnel management at the field level. The qualifications of UNGCI officers are established as a major of the army or its equivalent from the police service. OIP approaches the permanent missions of the countries for CVs of the qualified officers. The CVs are sent to the Chief UNGCI for his approval. Certain other criterion like language, driving skills are also laid down. The Sector Commander (Erbil, Dohuk and Suleymaniah) does quarterly performance appraisal of the officers under his/her jurisdiction. At the end of their stay, the chief UNGCI does a performance appraisal of the officers and sends it to OIP for onward

transmission to the concerned 'Permanent Missions'. A report is sent to OIP two months in advance of repatriation date of UNGCI officers in order to obtain replacements.

26. The existing format of CV in use for recruitment of UNGCI officials is too general and does not have specific details. In our opinion, for such recruitment the CVs should have more details, since they are the only available data on which decisions have to be made. During our discussion, the chief UNGCI showed us the proposal to modification on qualification criterion and CV format which was sent to OIP.

We recommend that OIP modify the CV format in order to provide more details to reduce the risk in the recruitment process (AF02/22/1/113).

Co-ordination with Agencies

27. UNGCI's main role is to provide security advice to agencies for their programme and personnel. In order to do so, UNGCI needs information from the agencies about their program activities and personnel. Thus, an effective information system is critical to UNGCI's effectiveness in ensuring safety for UN program and personnel.

28. A security situation report is provided by UNGCI in the weekly heads of the agency meeting. Each agency is required to appoint a Security Focal Point (SFP) for liaison with UNGCI. UNGCI has detailed the responsibilities of SFP and forwarded it to UNOHCI. The SFP is required to serve as an interface by disseminating information and implement various security guidelines in their organization. SFP is thus, a vital link between the UNGCI and agencies and is critical to the effective functioning of UNGCI.

29. UNGCI issues 'Security Advisories' from time to time based on the prevailing security situation arising due to specific security related incidents. These are in addition to the necessary security aspects/guidelines highlighted by the Chief UNGCI during the weekly 'Heads of Agencies' meeting, Security Focal Points meetings and Security Management team meetings. SFPs of agencies have a vital role in UNGCI's functioning as a link between the staff and the UNGCI. However, we found that in one case (UNOPS in Dohuk) an SFP had not even been designated.

30. Due to the UN staff (including the SFPs) on ORB/leave at regular intervals, it is prescribed that an alternative SFP should be designated. We observed that this was not always the case for example during inspection of safe havens in Suleymaniah by UNGCI, the regular SFP of FAO was on leave and the alternative SFP was found to be unaware of the procedures and preparations.

31. We also found that information dissemination in the agencies was very limited. Though UNGCI issued 28 security advisories in the last five months, not even one was received by UN staff members. For staff members no update of the security situation, in general, was available. We are of the opinion that, a general appreciation of the security situation prevailing in the area is a must for UN staff members.

We recommend:

- (i) UNOHCI issue Administrative instructions/directives to all UN Agencies, re-iterating the duties and responsibilities of SFPs (AF02/22/1/114);
- (ii) UNOHCI through IAAWG ensure that SFPs and alternate SFPs are appointed in all agencies (AF02/22/1/115); and
- (iii) UNGCI should e-mail security advisories meant for general circulation to all international staff members, directly. This would eliminate existing gaps, which exist due to the additional stage of SFP being included in the process (AF02/22/1/116).

32. UNGCI needs a reliable database of the UN staff in North in order to perform its work satisfactorily. This includes their addresses, names and addresses of their housekeepers, etc. All the staff members arriving in North should check in with UNGCI and get a security briefing, including visitors. In order to check the functioning of the above control mechanism, we verified UNGCI records to determine if all UN staff members had checked in with the UNGCI, provided the necessary particulars and had been briefed on security.

33. We found that this database was not being properly maintained. Furthermore, it was not possible to ascertain whether a particular UN Staff had been security briefed or not. Further, all movements of staff coming in or going out of Northern Iraq, were not reported to the UNGCI by UN Agencies in the absence of which the effectiveness of UNGCI's operations was being compromised.

34. Presently the photo IDs, of all the UN staff members, are issued in Baghdad by the Security section. Issuing of the photo ID by Security, also functions as a control whereby it is ensured that every staff member does get security briefed on arrival to mission. We observed that, albeit a photo ID machine had been procured for the North, it has not yet been installed.

We recommend:

- (i) UNGCI should entrust SFPs to collect and obtain UN staff members' particulars and forward them to UNGCI in order to complete the database of all UN staff members. (AF02/22/1/117); and
- (ii) The photo ID machine should be installed in UNGCI and all UN staff members in Northern Iraq required to get their photo IDs from UNGCI (AF02/22/1/118).

Operations

35. One of the preventive and detective measures for ensuring the security of the UN staff members is the Radio check done by UNGCI. The 'Radio check' procedure along with certain other issues like 'Communication procedures in emergencies', 'Hiring of local guards and housekeepers' and 'Access control' was commented upon in our Audit Observation on 'Security Issues in North' (AF2000/050/5 dated 05/12/2000)

36. The objectives of the radio check are (i) to ensure that all radio sets provided to the staff are operational and can accordingly be used in emergencies both by staff and by UNGCI to advise staff in evolving situations; (ii) to ensure and verify that all UN personnel stationed in North Iraq are safe; and (iii) to ensure that UN staff members are comfortable with radio communication.

37. We previously observed that the radio check was being taken casually by the staff members and the purported objectives were not being completely met. In a recent decision of May 2002, the daily centralized radio check by UNGCI has been done away with and substituted by a daily check by the Agencies themselves and a weekly check by UNGCI.

38. In this regard, a perusal of the directions issued in this regard by UNOHCI revealed that, for the daily radio check the staff members were given the option to do the radio check through the cordless phone sets. In our opinion, the modified procedure, which removes a control of daily check by UNGCI, does not offer adequate compensatory control. Radio communication would be the key in emergency, since the broadcast mode of communication will be the only effective one under those circumstances.

39. We also found that, there was no procedure/practice for surprise radio check. The surprise check had been performed once in 2000, the results of which were incorporated in the above mentioned audit observation.


We recommend:

(i) UNOHCI reverse the decision of May 2002 of de-centralised radio check by Agencies and the radio check be done in a centralized manner by UNGCI, and by radio only. This would ensure that the objectives of radio check are truly met (AF02/22/1/119); and

(ii) Surprise (unannounced) radio check be done once a month. This would ensure that staff members keep their radio sets switched on all the time and can be contacted in case of emergency (AF02/22/1/120).

40. UNGCI carries out Field Security Assessments (FSA), in order to gather intelligence for assessment of the security situation. FSA's are visits undertaken by UNGCI officers in various areas of the three governorates in Northern Iraq. They collect intelligence by interaction with general populace, local authorities etc. The report on FSAs is received in the Sector Headquarters where they are collated. We collected the details of number of FSAs conducted in the last 4 years, which are summarized in the following bar chart:

41. We note and appreciate that operational efficiency of UNGCI in terms of number of FSAs has showed an improving trend.



Communication between the UNGCI bases

42. UNGCI has its headquarters in Erbil. Its operations are coordinated from three sectors namely Erbil, Dohuk and Suleymaniah. In addition, there are two team bases at Zakho and Diana, where UNGCI personnel are stationed. A secure and effective communication network between the different locations is critical to operations. Between these bases the communication links consist of UN telephone lines and Radios. Satellite phones have been provided to all the stations for emergency purpose. However, Lotus Notes e-mail network exists only between the three sectors.

43. We found that in absence of a Lotus Notes e-mail network in the two bases in Diana and Zakho, the data transfer capability was poor. Whenever, there was a need to transfer reports/documents from these bases, the practice was for a physical delivery though UNGCI vehicles. This is not cost effective and is also time consuming.

We recommend:

Email Servers be installed in these two locations and they be connected with Lotus Notes. This would improve the communication with Sectors and headquarters and thus contribute to increase the operational efficiency and effectiveness (AF02/22/1/121).

Emergency Preparedness

44. Northern Iraq is in Phase IV of security categorization, which means that, any deterioration in the security situation would lead to, suspension of the program and measures like 'survival in place' or 'evacuation'. 'Preparedness' would be the most vital in that eventuality.

45. UNGCI, has responsibility to advise agencies of steps to be taken for 'preparedness', like identification of safe havens, provision of emergency supplies, etc., and monitoring implementation of these measures. Furthermore, UNGCI will have to take over the co-ordination role in the event of emergency. UNGCI has prepared a 'Contingency Plan for Northern Iraq'. The copy of the plan has been given to all the Heads of Agencies in North. The plan was comprehensively updated in November 2001, and gives detailed guidelines on the measures to be taken.

46. We observed that, although UNGCI had established guidelines for preparation of safe havens and stocking of emergency supplies in the plan, the controls to ensure its implementation were not effective. In UNOHCI, which is the co-ordinating agency in North, the efforts for preparation of safe-haven, provision of emergency supplies, etc. were found wanting by UNGCI. Some of the other agencies have also been found lacking in preparation. The risk of being caught unaware and unprepared, in the eventuality of an emergency is unacceptable in our opinion.

47. The chain of command and control in the situation of emergency will have to be different from the normal scenario. In the contingency plan the chain of command and control in the event of emergency is as follows:




Figure 1: Chain of Command and control in times of Emergency

48. An examination of the above reveals that, in the event of an emergency, it is not clear whether the top level is with the DHC or Chief UNGCI. Furthermore, it is not clear whether SFP will receive instructions from zone wardens or the Heads of Agencies.

49. Discussions with the chief UNGCI revealed that, in an emergency all commands would flow from the UNGCI channel only. However, the decisions would be taken in consultation with the DHC.

50. The preparedness of emergency does not end with preparation of the plan. The plan needs to be regularly tested by conducting regular drills of emergency procedures. This ensures that, the key personnel including all staff are aware of their roles in the emergency scenario. It also brings out the need for any modification that become necessary due to changes in ground situation.

51. Though, the emergency plan is prepared and has been updated, we found that the 'drill' involving all agencies had not been conducted for more than two years. Though there was a plan to conduct it in May 2002, it had to be cancelled/scaled down on interventions of UNOHCI.

52. UNGCI, in the contingency plan has identified three alternative routes for evacuation via Jordan, Turkey and Iran, in that order of preference. In the actual eventuality of evacuation, these routes can be successfully taken only with the co-operation of the concerned Governments. Since communication networks may be unavailable there is a need for a standing arrangement.

53. Discussions with Chief UNGCI revealed that no such agreement existed, at least to the knowledge of UNGCI. Furthermore, though all three alternative routes of evacuation are road routes, we found that the drivers in UNOHCI (North) did not have valid travel documents in form of UN/LPs. In our opinion, this leaves a major gap in the emergency preparedness.

We recommend that:

- (i) UNOHCI in co-ordination with UNGCI should issue directives including guidelines for UN staff members, re-iterating the requirements for emergency preparedness and set a deadline for implementation by agencies (AF02/22/1/122);
- (ii) UNGCI modify the command and control chart to make it unambiguous and clear and bring it to the notice of all concerned. This would mitigate the risk of confusion in emergency situations which can have disastrous consequences (AF02/22/1/123);
- (iii) UNGCI in co-ordination with UNOHCI should decide on a time to conduct an emergency drill involving agency personnel in order to ensure the workability of the emergency situation measures.(AF02/22/1/124);
- (iv) OIP formalize agreements with the Governments for passage in case of emergency evacuations in order to increase assurance of safe evacuation of UN personnel in an emergency (AF02/22/1/125); and
- (v) UNOHCI issue UN/LPs to all the drivers in the North and also ensure that the same is done by all the UN Agencies in order to ensure that, in the event of

evacuation, trained drivers who are the familiar with the terrain would be available (AF02/22/1/126).

54. We wish to express our appreciation for the assistance and co-operation extended to the Auditors by UNGCI and UNOHCI.

Cc:

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Mr. Tesfaye Maru, Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator, UNOHCI

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